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David Vaver*

Need Intellectual Property be Everywhere?:
Against Ubiquity and Uniformity

Intellectual property is more prevalent in every corner of our working and leisure
lives. International pressure, through both bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties
is causing intellectual property law to standardize at high levels throughout the
world. Legal standardization may be beneficial in general but is not so for
intellectual property in either the developed or the developing world. The law in
developed countries is currently incoherent and itself requires major
reconsideration. The imposition of such a defective law on the developing world
is helpful to neither side. The paper argues that current intensification and
harmonization trends are therefore undesirable, and that retrenchment and
diversity in intellectual property law are preferable strategies for both developed
and developing countries.
Le domaine de la proprietd intellectuelle est omnipresent dans nos vies, du travail
aux loisirs. Par Ientremise des trait5s bilat6raux et multilateraux, la communaut6
internationale demande la normalisation des lois reliues au droit de propridt6
intellectuelle a un niveau exigeant. La normalisation juridique en general peut
s'avdrer avantageuse dans le domaine de la propridt, intellectuelle, mais ne lest
pas ni pour les pays industrialises, ni pour les pays en voie de developpement.
La loi dans les pays industrialis6s est pr6sentement incoh6rente et necessite
une revision importante. L'imposition d'une telle loi aux pays en voie de
developpement n'avantagepersonne. Lauteur proposera que les tendances
actuelles d'intervention et d'harmonisation ne sont pas souhaitables. IIaccentuera
6galement les strategies pr6ferables de retranchement et de diversit6 dans le
domaine du droit de la propriet6 intellectuelle.

* Reuters Professor of Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, University of Oxford; Director, Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre, St Peter's College, Oxford; Professorial
Fellow, St Peter's College.
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Introduction
Some have called intellectual property law the most boring subject known
to man but, boring or not, intellectual property (IP) is omnipresent and
certainly much more talked about than once was the case. Twenty years
ago, the press ran few IP-related stories. Today, no week or sometimes
even day goes by without a paper or news magazine coming out with one.
For example, on the flight from Heathrow to Halifax to deliver this
lecture, I picked up a copy of Time and Business Week magazines, and the
next morning I glanced through The Globe and Mail. All had IP items in
them, The Globe without knowing it. Business Week had an Op-Ed piece
on "How To Achieve Digital Nirvana"-not an article about tossing out all
computers but instead about the need for protagonists in the copyright wars
on the Internet to reach a compromise solution.' Time had three pieces.
One reported the European Commission's decision that feta cheese from
Greece alone could be labelled "feta"; producers outside Greece, who
currently make most feta-style cheese, were considering legal action.2
Another piece dealt with the current trend for orchestras to record their
performances on their own-name labels, and talked about the royalty split
for performers.' Yet another dealt with the heats for the America's Cup
yacht race currently being run off New Zealand. The syndicate from Seattle
had somehow got hold of the design secrets of three of the other boats and
had been disciplined for this skullduggery.4

I. Stephen H. Wildstrom, "How to Achieve Digital Nirvana" Business Week [European Edition] (4
November 2002) 10.
2. Blaine Grateman, "Biz Watch" Time [Atlantic] 160:18 (28 October 2002) 22 at para. 13.
3. James Inverne, "The DIY Symphony; Orchestras are defying the slump in classical CD sales by
launching their own record labels" Time [Atlantic] 160:18 (28 October 2002) 60.
4.
Tom Dusevic, "Luxury Crews; Millons of dollars, sleek yachts and skullduggery come together
in the race for the America's Cup" Time [Atlantic] 160:18 (28 October 2002) 56.
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The piece in The Globe and Mail by Drew Fagan was entitled "Sweet
Continental Harmony."' It dealt with the possibility of Canada's concluding
a NAFTA-plus agreement with the United States. Fagan thought the time
was ripe to create "one North American economic space." He cited Canadian
International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew, who spoke of the need to
"better co-ordinat[e] Canadian and U.S. regulations in everything from civil
aviation safety to pesticide registration. '6 IP, though not universally classed
as a form of pesticide, is nevertheless sure to be on the list of any NAFTAplus deal: the TRIPs-plus bilateral treaties the U.S. is currently concluding
all include IP provisions. Fagan's article is timely and I return to its
implications later.
My talk has four interlinked themes:
" IP is now everywhere, in the sense both that it surrounds us in most
of our working and leisure environment, and also that it now exists
virtually throughout the world in pretty much this intensive form.'
" Despite these phenomena, difference and variation have always been
features of IP.
" As currently configured in the developed world, IP is excessive. It
needs trimming back.
" Ubiquity and uniformity are not always virtues in law, and,
globalization notwithstanding, they are not virtues for IP law, which
in many respects is incoherent and morally indefensible. If it were a
product, it would be declared unmerchantable and unfit for its
purpose. That is no testimonial for a law that the developed world
continues to impose on the developing world. The tendency towards
ubiquity and uniformity needs to be reversed. A nation should, within
broad limits, be free to strike its own balance in its IP laws to suit its
own circumstances: fewer and more varied IP laws should be
considered virtues, not vices. (Note that I stress both "within broad
limits" and "balance.")
The Supreme Court of Canada recently recognized the notion that IP
laws must be balanced and that different nations can, with perfect propriety,
strike the balance differently.' A painter tried to use the CopyrightAct to
stop his works from being transferred from posters and cards on to canvas
and then being resold. Copyright law stops unauthorized "reproduc[tion]"

5.
Drew Fagan, "Sweet Continental Harmony" The Globe and Mail (29 October 2002) A19.
6.
Ibid. at para. 11.
7. At least in theory. Enforcement of the law is variable, which in itself is telling.
8.
Th~berge v. GaleriedArt du Petit Champlain(2002), 210 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 17 C.P.R. (4th) 161,
2002 SCC 34 [Th~berge].
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of the copyright holder's work,9 but a majority of the Court refused to read
"reproduction" expansively to catch the impugned activity. In copyright,
as in biology, reproduction usually means adding one more unit to the
species beyond what existed before. In the case of the paintings, the image
was chemically transferred from poster or card to canvas. The poster or
card was now blank; the canvas was not. The net increase in paintings was
zero: hence no reproduction. Binnie J. for the court majority paid nodding
homage to "the globalization of the so-called 'cultural industries"' and to
the desirability "within the limits permitted by our own legislation, to
harmonize our interpretation of copyright protection with other like-minded
jurisdictions."'" That said, like-minded jurisdictions differed: civil law
jurisdictions gave authors more control over what buyers did with a work
than occurred in common law jurisdictions. Such restrictions could be
imposed by clear legislation but not by judges interpreting legislation
expansively. The following important passages appear in the judgment:
The CopyrightAct is usually presented as a balance between promoting
the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of
the arts and intellect and obtaining ajust reward for the creator (or, more
accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator from appropriating
whatever benefits may be generated) ... The proper balance among these
and other public policy objectives lies not only in recognizing the creator's
rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. In crassly economic
terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors for
the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate
them... Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of
intellectual property may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to
incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term interests
of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization."
What is over- or under-compensation or excessive control clearly
involves a value judgment, a weighing of costs and benefits, striking a
balance, and recognizing that the matter is one on which minds even within
the same state-let alone among states-may reasonably differ.
At the same time, we should recognize that some standardization is
beneficial. While nations should have the discretion "within broad limits"
to chart their own IP course, some common core rules may reasonably be
adopted. For example, one could argue for standardized property and
liability rules on the Internet, e.g., on questions such as entitlement to a
9. Copyright Act, R.S.C 1985, c. C-42, s. 3(1).
10. Th~berge, supra note 8 at para. 6.
11. Ibid. at paras. 30-32.
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domain name or the liability of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for carrying
infringing material. In the former case, a domain name may be adopted in
one country but may have immediate worldwide impacts on others. In the
latter case, where and how an ISP chooses to operate can be fortuitous;
liability should not turn on chance elements such as the location of the
server or the ISP's notional place of business. More generally, the
requirements of what should be protected worldwide could be relatively
standardized at the core, but nations should have greater flexibility than
they do now to exclude items from protection and to set conditions and
levels of protection according to their notions of economic interest.
These suggestions may seem modest but are actually quite controversial.
The current trend is toward "one world, one law" for IP, and that law is, for
the most part, not arrived at democratically through the parliamentary
process. It comes from meetings of bureaucrats and industry lobbyists in
international fora far removed from their countries of origin: Geneva,
Montevideo, Marrakesh, Doha. Parliaments then are presented withfaits
accomplis: they must enact implementing legislation or expose their country
2
to international economic sanctions.1
This process is seen most graphically in the conclusion in 1994 of TRIPs
(the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IPRs, including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods) as part of the World Trade OrganizationAgreement. 3
Nations wishing to be part of a liberalized world trading system had to
accept a far from liberalizing set of IP rules. Many of the national
representatives at the meetings at which the rules were fixed clearly did
not appreciate what they had signed on to-as is now becoming apparent.
Their countries have found out since, and many are not at all happy. Claims
by pharmaceutical companies that international IP rules prevented poor
AIDS-ravaged countries from making patented anti-AIDS drugs available
to patients at a lower return than patent holders wanted, proved to be a final
straw. IP law started to look a luxury that only the rich could afford and
that in poor countries cost lives. TRIPs is currently being reviewed but

12. See Peter Drahos (with John Braithwaite), Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge
Economy? (London, England: Earthscan Publications, 2002).
13. Agreement on trade-relatedaspects of intellectualproperty rights, Annex IC of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, B.T.S. 57 (1996), A.T.S. 1995/8 (entered
into force 1 January 1995), online: World Trade Organization <http://www.wto.org/english/docse/
legal-e/legale.htm> [TRIPS].
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negotiations to change it are proving slow and difficult. Those with
4
advantages are always loathe to give them up.'

I. Part One
What is meant by IP? The most familiar and oldest sets of IP rights are
probably patents, copyrights and trade secrets, joined a little later by
trademarks and industrial design rights. More recently, new rights have
appeared over performances, integrated circuit topographies and plant
varieties, the laws of torts and delict have expanded to cover various acts
of unfair competition, and in other jurisdictions rights in databases and
minor subpatentable inventions have also been created.
In Canada, IP issues have been handled by federal and provincial
jurisdictions acting in tandem. At confederation, the federal parliament
established IP rights (IPRs) under its exclusive power over patents,
copyrights, and the regulation of interprovincial trade and commerce. The
provinces had their own supplementary IPRs, created either by legislation
or judge-made law. These rights run against various acts of unfair
competition, e.g., passing-off one's business, products or services as
another's, or improperly taking another's trade secrets or confidential
information.
Just as the federal parliament keeps adding to the IP menu, so too do
the provinces. Thirty years ago, the Ontario courts decided to follow a U.S.
trend to give celebrities the right to exploit the value attaching to their
personal attributes: their name, likeness and voice. Other provinces had
dealt with this perceived problem by passing cautious privacy legislation
from the 1960s. Ontario had not, but this did not deter the Ontario courts.
Judges were entitled to develop the common law to reflect commercial
realities and expectations; it was just a little step, to create from a patchwork
of indirect and indistinct rights, a clear stand-alone right in a celebrity to
prevent the misappropriation of his or her personality. 5
14. As to how Dr Horace Read would have reacted to these particular events, I have little doubt. On
the more general question, on whether nations should have wide flexibility to tailor IP laws to their
own circumstances, I suspect he too would have been sympathetic. From early days, a major interest
of his (indeed the subject of his doctoral thesis) was the conflict of laws--or, in its less combative
nomenclature, private international law-the means by which we decide which system of law should
govern a particular dispute or issue where an activity or its impact crosses national, state or provincial boundaries. A premise of private international law is that different countries will have different
laws; hence the need for a ubiquitous and uniform meta-law to resolve, in a given case, which system
of substantive law should be preferred. Dean Read's Canadian roots and experience no doubt shaped
his attitude. Difference is a historical feature of Canadian law and life, a value not merely to be
tolerated but as often celebrated.
15. Krouse v. Chrysler CanadaLtd. (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 225, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 15 (C.A.).
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Somewhat oddly, other Canadian courts followed the Ontario line to
create an overlapping common law right even where the province in question
protected the celebrity's right through legislation.16 The contours of this
common law right against misappropriation of personality still remain far
from clear.17 How well-known need one be to qualify as a celebrity? How
long does the right last? What acts does it apply to? Does it behave like
copyright and outlast the celebrity for 50 years past his or her death? Might
it run forever, at least as long as the memory of the celebrity lives on in
people's hearts and minds?
On such questions, the law that Canadian courts have traditionally turned
to, British law, has been of little help. It has steadfastly turned back attempts
to create a new-fangled "quasi-copyright" in a person's name or image.
The estate of the late Elvis Presley, buoyed by successes in its home country
in gaining control over third-party uses of the singer's attributes, tried in
vain to convince English courts to grant it a similar privilege. Saying that
"[m]onopolies should not be so readily created,"' 8 the Court of Appeal
held that the estate could not register 'Elvis', 'Elvis Presley' and Presley's
signature as trademarks for toiletries. It granted superior rights to a local
trader who had long been selling Presley memorabilia without complaint,
and who had secured a U.K. trademark registration over 'Elvisly Yours' for
similar goods. In more recently extending the old passing-off tort to prevent
the commercial use of a celebrity's image to endorse products, the English
court was again at pains to point out that the action would have failed, had
the element of implicit endorsement and thus misrepresentation been
absent.'9
At this stage, one might legitimately ask: what has all this to do with
IP? What is "intellectual" about the image that has developed around a
celebrity person-probably more a fabrication of media relations
consultants than anything the celebrity may him or herself have done?
Labelling this "property" "intellectual" itself sounds a fabrication. A British
IP judge makes that point graphically:
The general area of law now called "Intellectual Property" is in the main
a law conferring private rights on one party to prevent competition from
others. It is fundamentally about industry-an economic law-a law that
controls or forms the base for industrial activities. To call it "intellectual"
is misleading. It takes one's eye off the ball. "Intellectual" confers a
16. Joseph v. Daniels (1986), 4 B.C.L.R. (2d) 239, 11 C.P.R. (3d) 544 (S.C.).
17. See e.g. Gould Estate v. Stoddart Publishing(1996), 30 O.R. (3d) 520, 74 C.P.R. (3d) 206 (Gen.
Div.), aff'd (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 545, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (C.A.).
18. Elvis Presley Trade Marks, [1999] R.P.C. 567 at 598 (C.A.), Simon Brown L.J.
19. Irvine v. Talksport Ltd., [2002] 2 All ER 414, [2002] 1 WL.R. 2355, [2002] E.WH.C. 367
(Ch.D.), aff'd on liability and damages increased [2003] E.WC.A. Civ. 423 (C.A.).
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respectability on a monopoly which may well not be deserved. A squirrel
is a rat with good P.R."
These points are well made. The IP label is a relatively recent concoction.
The unifying phrase used to be "intellectual and industrial property": the
"intellectual" part covered copyright, which was devoted to the arts-the
product of the intellect, and typically created for its own sake (think
Wordsworth, Baudelaire). Industrial property covered patents, designs and
trademarks (think 'Coca-Cola', 'IBM' or 'Microsoft'). These might or might
not engage the intellect. Inventing and designing typically did; concocting
a trademark typically did not. The decision to call shredded wheat breakfast
cereal 'Shreddies' may, in some quarters, be called intellectual or even
creative. But the cerebration involved is trivial, except by the inflated
standards of Madison Avenue and its counterparts. The common thread
that does unite patents, designs and trademarks is the object with which
the activity giving rise to these rights is done: for industrial ends, not for
their own sake.
Of course, a moment's hesitation reveals that the supposed opposition
between "industrial" and "non-industrial" is itself false. Writers, artists
and composers may live to create, but they also create to live-and have
done so for centuries. Music records, books and posters that circulate in
their thousands or millions are as much mass-produced industrial products
as are computers and breakfast cereals.
Similarly, the supposed opposition between the "industrial" and the
"creative" is equally false. Inventing usually involves "intellectual" work,
often of a higher order than required to obtain a copyright, but even here
the patient slogger can be as inventive, legally, as the Archimedean bather.
Much copyright work, too, has little "intellectual" attached to it either.
There is currently a debate in Commonwealth courts about whether just
being "industrious" can give you a copyright; the more widespread view is
that it can. Catalogues and even lists of things such as fox hunting days"1
and sports fixtures 22 have been treated in the U.K. as "original" compilations
entitled to copyright, and an Australian court recently said the same of an
ordinary white pages telephone directory. 23 That point is presently in

20. Robin Jacob, "The Stephen Stewart Memorial Lecture: Industrial Property-Industry's Enemy"
(1997) 1 I.P.Q. 3 at para. 2.
21. University of London Press Ltd. v. University TutorialPressLtd., [ 1916] 2 Ch. 601 at 608, 115
L.T. 301.
22. Ladbroke (Football)Ltdv. William Hill (Football)Ltd., [1964] 1 All E.R. 465, [1964] 1 W.L.R.
273 (H.L.).
23. Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd. v. Telstra CorporationLtd., [2002] FCAFC 112, leave to
appeal to High Court of Australia refused by the High Court.
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controversy in Canada. The Federal Court of Appeal a few years ago thought
that the typical yellow pages business directory-and certainly a white
pages telephone directory-was not original enough to have copyrightnot enough creativity.2 4 Just this year, a different panel of judges of that
Court thought that creativity was not needed for copyright.25 Edison may
have thought that "genius" was 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration. But
for copyright, 0% inspiration and 100% perspiration seems enough, and
the perspiration need amount to no more than the slightest of glows. Coolly
writing an ordinary business letter,26 billet doux, or even a "dear diary"
entry, 27 is original enough for the writer to acquire a copyright in his or her
expression-a "poor ill-favoured thing" maybe, but "mine own."
People-including, contrary to normal expectations, even lawyerstend to abbreviate lengthy phrases, and so it has become with the ponderous
"industrial and intellectual property." The choice whether to shorten the
tag to "industrial property" or "intellectual property" was clear to those
who worked to promote and establish the field: better the squirrel than the
rat. For one thing, industrial property invokes commercially zoned buildings.
For another, to protect matters "intellectual" sounded more easily justifiable
than to protect matters merely "industrial," and could appeal to homely
rhetoric: what could more properly be termed a man or woman's own than
what came out of his or her mind? So "intellectual property" the field
became, however contentious both the "intellectual" and the "property"
parts were. (What is now "property" was once "privilege": benefits
conferred upon individuals by the state in its discretion, not as of right.)
So publicity rights for celebrities have come to fall under the IP umbrella.
The relationship between Shania Twain and her persona can be treated, in
one aspect, much like the relationship between the Kellogg Company and
the "Kellogg Co." trademark. If the latter is IP, then so is the former, 28 and

24. Tele-Direct (Publications)v. American Business Information (1997), [1998] 2 EC. 22, 154 D.L.R.
(4th) 328 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 660 [Tele-Direct].
25. CCH CanadianLtd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 4 EC. 213, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 2002
FCA 187, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [CCH Canadian].
26. British Oxygen Co. Ltd v. LiquidAir Ltd., [1925] Ch. 383.
27. A. v. B., [2000] E.M.L.R. 1007 (Ch.D.).
28. If more were needed, then one need only call in aid paragraphs 9(l)(k) and (1)of the Trade-marksAct,
R.S.C. 1985, c.T-13, as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 14,s. 8; 1993, c. 15, s. 58; 1994, c.47,s. 191; 1999, c. 31, s.
209 (F). There, the adoption in connection with a business of any mark that falsely suggests a connection
with any living individual, or that consists of or closely resembles the portrait of any individual who is
living or who has died in the last 30 years, is banned. The affected individual may, under those provisions,
obtain an injunction against the adopter, without proof of injury or damage. So the well-known Rothschild
family successfully relied both on their publicity rights and on s.9 of the Trade-marksActto stop a Toronto
cigar merchant calling himself "Rothschild at Yorkville." (Baron Philippe de Rothschild S.A. v. La Casa
de Habana(1987), 19 C.P.R.(3d) 114, 17 C.I.P.R. 185 (Ont. H.C.J.). See also Carson v. Reynolds, [19801
2 FC. 685, 49 C.P.R. (2d) 57 (T.D.)).
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the legal incidents developed for IP law tend to spill over by analogy to
personality rights.
So what exactly are patents, trademarks and copyrights, and what they
are for?
To deal with the second question first: theories abound on what IP rights
are for, but the most justifiable theory is economic. Creative work can cost
time and effort to produce; it is cheap to replicate. Without protection few,
or fewer, workers would be encouraged to toil in those fields, and their
output would be inferior to what would be created under conditions of no
free riding.
As for what IP rights look like: take, first, patents. Patents are granted
to protect new, non-obvious and useful inventions. They last for twenty
years from the date an application is filed with a patent office. A patent
prevents everyone within the granting territory from exploiting the
invention, even independent creators who know nothing of the earlier
invention. In recent years, patents have come to be granted over not only
mechanical products and processes, but also (somewhat controversial!y)
over such technologies as computer programs, business methods and
genetically engineered higher life forms. The last-mentioned form of
technology recently came from the Supreme Court of Canada in the guise
of the question whether or not a mouse implanted with a cancer gene could
be patented in Canada. The mouse had been patented in the U.S. and Europe
but the Supreme Court, dividing 5:4 and reversing a 2:1 decision of the
Federal Court of Appeal, decided that higher life forms could not be patented
under the current PatentAct.The technology was beyond what the Act ever
envisaged, and it was for Parliament to decided whether and, if so, how to
provide it.29 The setback for biotechnology patenting is, however, likely to
be only temporary. Where stakes are high, being odd man out in the IP
world does not generally last for long.
The law of copyright traces back to the early eighteenth century-some
say even earlier. It used to protect just books but judges soon expanded
that to include any printed piece of paper: e.g., a single page of sheet music.
Now it is designed to stop the copying of an extraordinarily wide range of
things-almost anything written, drawn, or expressed in any way-from
e-mails to databases, from elaborate artwork to children's finger-paintings,
from opera to broadcast call signals. Unlike a patent, copyright protects
only against copying, not independent creation, but copying is broadly

29. President& Fellows of Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] S.C.J.
No. 77, 2002 SCC 76, rev'g [2000] 4 EC. 528, 189 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (C.A.), rev'g [1998] 3 FC. 510,
79 C.P.R. (3d) 98 (T.D.), aff'g Commissioner of Patents' decision of 4 August 1995.
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construed, perhaps too broadly.3 0 Acts such as translation, public
performance, broadcast, and even some renting (in Canada, over sound
recordings and computer programs) fall under the copyright holder's control.
Copyright lasts a long time: now life of the author plus fifty years (life plus
seventy years has recently become the European and U.S. norms).
The third pillar of IP is trademark law. Trademarks make the economy
function smoothly. Businesses use brands to advertise their products and
services; consumers rely on brands to buy what they want or feel they
want, and shun what they do not. The law has long supported efforts to
stop businesses from wrongly diverting consumers' buying decisions. The
trader who first supplied consumers under a particular brand could stop
other traders from using that brand, or a confusingly similar one, to capture
custom that rightly belonged to the first trader. True, consumers had some
recourse in such cases: they might get a refund on returning a product they
had mistakenly bought. But this occurred infrequently: they might never
discover their mistake; the product might do the job anyway; it might be
consumed before the mistake was found out, or it might just not be worth
the time and trouble needed to undo the error. Brand owners who were
injured in this way certainly had a major incentive to clamp down on false
marketing, and their efforts were supported by governments and courts
alike. Governments set up trademark registries where brand owners could
file their trademark claims, and also set up schemes to ease the resolution
of disputes over ownership and use of competing marks. Even without
such registries, courts developed the principles of common law and civil
law to give traders recourse against those who would lure customers away
by deceptive marking.

II. PartTwo
That IP is now everywhere, in the sense that it surrounds us in most of our
working and leisure environment, is a proposition easily proved. Those
who sit in front of a computer all day browsing the Internet and proprietary
databases-so-called "knowledge" workers: a term that encompasses
professors, money traders, even lawyers and judges-need little proof of
that. The content we see, hear or otherwise access is all covered by IP of
one sort or another.
Quite apart from the Internet, IP is everywhere. We are surrounded by
it. The packaged food we buy or eat, the clothes we wear, the products we

30. For example, subconscious copying can be infringement (Abkco Music v. HarrisongsMusic,
Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 at 999 (2nd Cir. 1983), involving the late George Harrison).
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use at home or at work, all carry trademarks. I need only mention 'CocaCola', 'Levis', 'IBM', 'Microsoft', 'Nike', or 'Seiko', and wherever I am
in the world, and whatever other language people speak there, those words
will be understood. McDonald's has succeeded where Esperanto has failed,
in creating a world language-no doubt, limited in imagination,
communicative purpose and range, but, within those parameters, supremely
effective.
The e-mails and letters we write, the notes we take and make, the
computer programs we use, the websites we access, the files we download
(with the copyright holder's consent, of course), the television programmes
we see, and the radio programmes we hear-all carry automatic copyright
protection. The cars we drive, the buses we take, the products we use-all
are either covered by patents, or contain critical parts or accessories that
are patented. The food we eat may come from plants that may be patented
or protected by plant breeder rights.
Even the house where we live or the building in which our apartment is
located, unless it is ancient (Georgian-i.e., George VI--or earlier?), is
protected by copyright. Ornate or humble, attractive or an eyesore, the
building is classified by copyright laws as an architectural work, a subset
of artistic work, a category buildings share with paintings and sculpture.
If the structure's design is original to its author-be that person an architect,
designer, builder or a simple layman-then nobody can copy all or a
substantial part of the design, without the consent of the author or whomever
he may have transferred the copyright to. Sometimes one may be even
unable to make additions or changes to the building without getting the
author's consent. Authors-and architects and designers are classed as
authors-may have "moral rights": they (and, after death, their estate) can
veto alterations or additions that might prejudice the author's honour or
reputation.
The phenomenon is worldwide. In 1992, Canada committed itself in
NAFTA to high levels of IP protection. The U.S., followed by Europe, insisted
on similar high levels of IP protection for everyone who wished to be part
of the World Trade Organization, and so it came to pass with the annexing
of TRIPs to the WTO Agreement in 1994. The WIPO Internet Treaties of
1996 committed adherents to the imposition of strict copyright controls on
material passing over the Internet.

III. Part Three
Yet difference and variation have always been features of IP law. This is
obvious when one looks at the different schemes of protection within IP
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law itself. There is no logical reason why books cannot be patented, and
indeed for a period in British history they were: for long the King's Printer
had patents over the printing of the authorized version of the Bible.
Eventually, however, copyright became the property of choice for books,
and patents were kept just for inventions. The terms of copyright and patents
were initially very similar: fourteen years for patents, fourteen years with
a further right of renewal of fourteen for copyrights. Eventually, however,
copyright developed its own internal logic and grew ever further apart from
the patent system, and trademarks too took their own separate course.
The present IP system is as different today from the systems of the 18 th
century as today's technology is from the technology of that century. States
deliberately developed their policies to suit their own economies and states
of development. In the 19 th century, the U.S. did not extend its copyright
law to foreigners; it wanted foreign-particularly British-books and ideas
to spread quickly and cheaply in the U.S.; its publishers were happy to
distribute foreign books at no cost, and Charles Dickens was ridiculed when
he toured the U.S. urging them to recognize his copyrights. Canada's 19 1h
century history too involved trying to import cheap unauthorized U.S.
reprints rather than the dearer editions British publishers made available.
How times have changed. Today, countries that do not recognize U.S.
copyrights are called thieves and pirates by U.S. media producers and are
threatened by their proxy, the U.S. Trade Representative, with trade
sanctions. Canada too has sometimes joined the U.S. chorus.
What is lost from this discourse is the obvious point that there is no
single platinum standard IP law. Countries at different levels of cultural
and economic development do not need or want an IP law that has been
developed and refined for countries having a very different culture and
economy. This point was glossed over in the globalization rush of the late
2 0 th century, but will not go away.

IV PartFour

So, one may say, what? Why should not high levels of protection be granted
to creative and innovative work? Does not the very presence of so much
IP-protected work prove that the system is working? If IP were not all around
us, there would be fewer worthy works around, and that would be a bad
thing.
The argument is good if the premise is valid: that without IP there would
be in fact less innovation and fewer worthy works. This proposition may be
empirically true for some works and activities, but it is demonstrably untrue
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for others. The key is to identify those classes of work where production is
less than desirable.
As for cases where work would be produced with or without IP
protection: consider architecture. There was no copyright law covering
architecture or anything else in ancient days; yet buildings that were
extraordinary, judged by standards then and now, were designed and erected
throughout the ancient world. Indigenous people needed no copyright laws
to encourage them to design effective dwellings: harsh nature provided the
incentive. In international copyright law, architecture was unprotected before
1908; unprotected in the U.K. before 1912, in Canada before 1924, and in
the U.S. before 1990. If the incentive argument holds, then the absence of
copyright law would have produced no buildings at all in these countries
before those dates, or at least fewer buildings and inferior ones at that.
Simple observation denies the validity of those arguments. The fee paid to
the designer and the consequent enhancement to reputation attending the
showing of his work were most often his or her incentive.
The incentive argument has little force in the production of vast classes
of work, both in days gone past and now. In Canada, as in other
Commonwealth states, legislation is said to have copyright. Do legislatures
produce more or better legislation because copyright spurs parliamentarians
on? (Libertarians would certainly argue for the withdrawal of copyright if
legislators would be discouraged from legislating more.) What ofjudges'
reasons for judgment, for which copyright has equally been claimed? Would
any judge refuse to write if his reasons had no copyright? Has any judge
written better because they had?3' Would Michelangelo have painted or
sculpted better or more had there been copyright laws then in place (there
were not)? Would more computer programs have been created during the
1970s with strong IP rights (protection then was, at best, uncertain)?
Equally consider the question of rights. U.S. and U.K. authors were
unprotected in each other's country during most of the 19 t'h century, and
they knew it. In theory, fewer books should have therefore been written in
the I91h century because authors or publishers would get no return on
unauthorized foreign publications. There is no empirical support at all for
that theory. Nineteenth century readers had plenty of art, music, literature
and drama to choose from. Would-could-Dickens have written any more
than he did, even though he knew he would be immediately copied in the
U.S. without authority or recompense? Harriet Beecher Stowe kept writing
for the rest of her life even as Uncle Tom s Cabin continued being widely

31. See David Vaver, "Copyright and the State in Canada and the United States" (1996) 101.P.J. 187
[Vaver, "Copyright and the State"].
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published worldwide without her authority She continued although she
also knew that her work could be translated even in her own country into
other languages: in 1853, she lost a U.S. court case against an unauthorized
German translator of Uncle Tom s Cabin, even though she planned herself
to bring out a German edition.32 Clearly, writers wrote and publishers
published despite what, to their and our eyes, appear to be quite defective
and primitive copyright laws.
To avoid misunderstanding, I am not arguing in favour of depriving
copyright holders of the right to control translations. Irrespective of incentive
arguments, such rights may be worth granting for fairness reasons. But
that shifts the argument to more unstable and debatable grounds. Fairness
arguments cannot avoid questions of costs and benefits. The cost of granting
additional copyrights is clear: the more rights are held by an IPR holderwhether on what is protected or the degree to which it is protected-the
less liberty of action other persons will have. Restricting the liberties of
all, including the right to compete, create or innovate within another IP's
field, may be more costly overall than granting more rights to some.
Moreover, the costs and benefits may vary depending on the time and
place. That is why a single standardized IP law worldwide seems a poor
object to strive for. Would good IP policy for the U.S. or Canada or the U.K.
inevitably be so for Rwanda or Oman or Fiji? Would good policy for the
U.S. necessarily be good policy for Canada?
Consider the following example. A few months ago, a musical group
called The Planets issued a record album which included a track titled
"One Minute Silence," attributed on the cover to John Cage and one of the
group's members, Mike Batt. The title was quite accurate: the track
comprised a minute's silence. When the record was released, the publishers
of John Cage's "work" entitled 4'33" complained that Batt had infringed
the copyright owned by Cage's estate. Cage's score reads thus on an
otherwise blank page: "4'33" FOR ANY INSTRUMENT OR
COMBINATION OF INSTRUMENTS. '33 The publisher, the alleged "right"
holder, argued not only that Cage's work had copyright but also that Batt
had infringed that copyright by his inclusion of a performance of a
substantial part of the piece on the record.

32. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 Fed. Cas. 201 (ED Pa. 1853).
33. John Cage (1993). 4'33" (Original version), Edition Peters, No. 6777a. This version, which
contains a 1960 copyright notice, adds 10 pages (or 12 pages, depending on whether one counts the
back inside and outside cover), on some of which appear vertical ruled lines, arranging time and
space according to the formula: "1 page = 7 inches = 56"." This addition is of intellectual interest
only and does not seem to modify any perceptible auditory feature of the work.
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This all sounds quite amusing, except that the publisher seemed to be
in earnest and the case in fact settled "without prejudice" on Batt's paying
Cage's estate an undisclosed sum, widely reported as £ 100,000, although
Batt says it was less. Unfortunately, U.K. and other Western laws, as currently
structured, allow such jokes to be plausibly and seriously played. Modern
copyright legislation deliberately leaves the definition of a musical work
vague. Standards of infringement are similarly vague: a "substantial part"
of the work cannot be reproduced, but "substantiality" is treated as a question
of "fact and degree," which gives lawyers and courts plenty of scope for
fuzzy argument and reasoning.
A newspaper columnist, dealing with the Cage/Batt imbroglio, had this
comment on the infringement issue:
My totally uninformed opinion is that one minute of silence is as different
from 4 minutes and 33 seconds of silence as Florida is from Alaska. If a
pianist sits at the keyboard for a minute and doesn't play a note, you
might not be sure if he is doing so intentionally or if he is simply
daydreaming about Reese Witherspoon. When the pianist sits motionless
for 4 minutes and 33 seconds, however, you can be pretty sure that he is
34
making some sort of artistic statement. Either that or he's dead.
That's not bad for a "totally uninformed opinion." An argument along
these lines is certainly on track on the issue of substantiality.
To cap matters, Batt now says he has registered copyrights "on all "silent
musical seconds" from one second up to 10 minutes"-except for 4'33".
"I've got him [Cage] hemmed in," Batt is reported as saying, "[h]e can't
move an inch, and he will be breaching my copyright if his piece is
performed and overruns by a second or two."35 Silence can indeed be golden.
Cage died in 1992. His estate can therefore continue to claim copyright
in 4'33" throughout the world until the end of 2042 and in some countries
even until the end of 2062. Perhaps the claim will be exploded before then
as a mere bubble. Music presupposes sound, and Cage's work is the
antithesis of that. Itmay be merely an unprotected "idea" rather than the
protected "expression" of an idea. So it may have no U.K. copyright.
34. David Grimes, "Sounds of silence prompt noisy feud" SarasotaHerald-Tribune (3 October
2002) El at paras. 10-11. Grimes added: "Also, I am of the opinion that the quality of silence has
changed over time. Fifty years ago, it was not that big a deal to pass 4 minutes and 33 seconds of your
life in complete silence. Today, itis unheard of, unless you live in a cave in Tibet, and even there I bet
a phone solicitor would find a way to ring you up at dinnertime just as you're lifting that first spoonful of yak soup to your lips." (ibid.at para. 12).
35. "The Scurra" The Mirror (3 October 2002) 14. Where exactly Batt has "registered" his copyrights is unclear. The U.K. has no copyright registry. Maybe Batt has registered in the U.S., or
perhaps he is just making a point.
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Even if Cage's work is copyright, consider the question of infringement.
Cage's claim would have been difficult had Batt not attributed the track on
his album to Cage. Having "produced" "his" 4' 33", Cage has no monopoly
over silences of this or any length, at best, only over those silences that
reproduce his. Veterans observing a minute's silence on Remembrance Day
can do so regardless of Cage. They "create" their own silences; they do not
re-create Cage's. Silence pre-dates Cage.
Even were a particular period of silence attributed to Cage, one returns
to the point that Cage's work is, if the expression of an idea, a simple
expression. Judges say that the simpler an expression, the more exact must
the copy be before it can be labelled as "substantial." Mike Batt's instincts
in claiming copyrights in longer and shorter silences may have a legal basis:
4'30" silence might infringe Cage's copyright; 1 minute or 10 minutes
probably would not.
One could argue that a law that pressures musicians to buy off claims
such as Cage's is absurd and cannot morally be imposed on other states. A
more modest argument against ubiquity and uniformity is also available.
Just because one country is willing, for its own reasons, to protect a
particular activity does not mean that another country need accept that
decision. Even if Cage's work were protected by copyright in the U.K.,
Canada need not extend it a Canadian copyright, nor need any another
country do so under its law. That is indeed the current position under
international law for copyright 6 but not for patents. States must make
patents available for any new, non-obvious and useful inventions "in all
fields of technology." 37 They cannot discriminate by place of invention,
field of technology, or by whether products are imported or locally produced.
Exceptions from these standards exist but they are few and narrow.3"
Developed countries are even now pressing to eliminate these exceptions
one by one, eventually to nothingness.
It is important to note the ideology at work here, for simplification
trends in one field of IP have a habit, like seeds in the wind, of crossing to
other fields. As goes patenting in TRIPs, so may go the law of copyright

36. TRIPs, supra note 13, Part II, s. 1, art. 9(1) compels the observance of Berne standards on
subject-matter. Berne allows member states some discretion on the protection of disputable works
such as "4'33". Subject-matter standards depend on the state where protection is claimed, whether
the work's country of origin or any other country affords that work copyright (Berne Conventionfor
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, of 9 September 1886, completed at Paris on 4 May
1896, revised at Berlin on 13 November 1908, completed at Berne on 20 March 1914, revised at
Rome on 2 June 1928, at Brussels on 26 June 1948, at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, and at Paris on 24
July 1971, and amended on 28 September 1979, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, 4(F), 31 (E), U.S. Treaty Doc. 9927 (entered into force 10 October 1974), art. 5(2) [Berne]).
37. TRIPs, ibid., Part II, s. 5, art. 27(1).
38. Ibid., Part II, s. 5, arts. 27(l)-(3).
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and trademarks. The ideology in patents clearly derives from the current
U.S. approach to patenting. 9 A U.S. patent can be obtained, in the rhetoric
accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court, for "anything under the sun that is
made by man."4 The premise is that any advance, good or bad, deserves
the reward of a patent. The patent system is there to grant property rights.
Property is thought to be good in itself and therefore deserving of
encouragement: the more property there is, the greater the incentive to use
and profit from it, and the better off society will be as a whole (ignoring
distributive effects). Under this conception, the grant of property is sharply
distinguished from its use. Just as a gun can be used for good or ill, so may
a property right. Just as any quantity of guns can freely be made, so may
any quantity of patents be created. Just as it is the job of other laws-tort
or criminal law-to regulate the use of guns, so it is the job of such other
laws-including competition law-to regulate the use of patent rights.
This ideology of the patent system is not the only one prevailing in the
developed world. A different view holds in Europe. There patents are indeed
property rights but their grant is not automatic. Technology may be good
or bad; if bad, it should be discouraged early on. Certainly, there should be
no incentive to develop anti-social technologies by offering the prospect of
a patent, or indeed any other privilege or financial grant. So it was under
the first English patent law, the Statute of Monopolies of 1624: no grant of
patent for an invention would be made that was "mischievous to the state
by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally
inconvenient. ' 4 For such reasons, patents for new machinery had been
denied in the 16 th century where the machines would throw workers out of
jobs and create social unrest. 42 Similarly now, a European patent cannot be
granted for an invention the exploitation of which would be "contrary to
"ordrepublic' or morality." Patenting in Europe is not a morally neutral
act: "The state, as granting authority, cannot disclaim responsibility for
the inventions for which it grants protection. '43 Inventors can claim no
natural right to benefit from immoral or socially disruptive activity, however

39. This and the following paragraphs are based on David Vaver, "Invention in Patent Law: A Review and A Modest Proposal" (2003) 11 Int. Jo. Law & IT 286 at 296 ff.
40. Diamond v. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 at 308 (1980).
41. Statute of Monopolies, 1623-24 (U.K.), 21 Ja. 1, c. 3.
42. More recently, in states which retain the 1624 formula-e.g., Australia and New Zealand-the
question whether business methods, medical and surgical treatments are patentable or not has been
decided partly by reference to whether the grant of a patent would be "generally inconvenient."
43. William R. Cornish, Intellectual Property:Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights,
4th ed. (London, England: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) at 228.
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ingenious. As a concession to Europe, this approach is reflected in a TRIPs
exception.4'
These may not be the only theories of IP protection that merit
consideration. Neither seems so morally superior that it warrants imposition
on unwilling third parties. I have elsewhere criticized the rhetoric that
insulates IP rights from being balanced by rights of at least equal
importance:
the right of people to imitate others, to work, compete, talk, and write
freely, and to nurture common cultures. The way intellectual property
should be reconciled with these values--or vice versa-has changed much
over time and continues to vary among countries and among legal systems.
The adjustments occur for social and economic reasons; they are not
preordained by natural law. Where a particular line should be drawn can
certainly not be answered by circularities like "intellectual property is
property...

V. PartFive
Let us return to the idea noted at the beginning of this discussion, that
there should be "one North American economic space." For IP, the practical
expression of this idea would mean the creation of identical IP laws
throughout the two countries. One might welcome that idea-if the laws
were all or most those that one liked. I expect I might like some, but not
most. The fear is not simply that U.S. law would largely supplant Canadian
law, although this is what happened in significant sections of NAFTA and
TRIPs. Rather, the stage would be set for a further increase in IP
protectionism on both sides of the border simply for the sake of uniformity,
not because of any forthcoming proof that additional protection was needed
as an incentive to create or innovate. In Europe, the experience has been to
harmonize up, not down: the highest, not lowest, common denominator of
protection tends to win out. Here is the irony, writ large, of the presence of
IP in a free trade agreement. IP is mostly about insulating large sectors of
the economy from free trade. It is about restricting trade and competition
both within the country and across borders. It is truly a rat in a squirrel's
coat.
Consider some random examples where the two laws now differ and
what "ironing out the differences" may result in.

44. Convention on the grant of Europeanpatents, 5 October 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199, 13 I.L.M.

268, Part II, c. 1, art. 53(a); reflected in TRIPs, supra note 13, Part 11,s. 5, arts. 27(2)-(3).
45. David Vaver, Intellectual PropertyLaw: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks (Concord, Ont.: Irwin
Law, 1997) at 5-6 [Vaver, Intellectual Property].
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Trade-marks
U.S. law protects well-known trademarks not only against confusing
uses but against dilution. Had Dalhousie Law School advertised my
lecture as 'The Greatest Show on Earth', under U.S. law not only
may it have been liable for misleading and deceptive advertising,
but also Ringling Bros. Circus could have sued under trademark law
to stop this use. Nobody would have been misled by the Law School's
claim into believing that I was about to do a trapeze or elephant act;
yet since 'The Greatest Show on Earth' is a registered mark and
famous to boot, its owner can stop even non-confusing noncompetitive uses in the U.S. that dilute the distinctive quality of the
46

phrase.

Canada also has an anti-dilution provision in its Trade-marksAct
but it is poorly drawn and-fortuitously, though, as some think,
fortunately-it does its job equally poorly.4 7 In Canada, the Michelin
Tire Company could not use trade-mark or passing-off law to stop a
trade union from using a caricature of its 'Bibendum' registered mark
in leaflets designed to persuade workers in Michelin's Nova Scotia
plants to join the union.4" In the U.S., Michelin would have had a
better chance, unless the union could successfully have pleaded free
49
speech rights (a defence that failed dismally in Canada).
Levelling U.S. and Canadian law would almost certainly require
Canada to amend its anti-dilution provisions to grant greater
protection to trade-mark owners. Under such a law, Ringling Bros.
might have prevailed against Dalhousie Law School in my
hypothetical above. Michelin might now win against the union unless
Canadian courts are willing now to take a wider view of the union's
free speech rights than prevailed in the actual case. 0
46. Ringling Bros. v. B.E. Windows, 937 E Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The U.S. Supreme Court recently
raised the barrier for these suits by requiring the claimant to prove actual loss of distinctiveness for its
mark and actual damage: VSecret Catalogue,Inc. v. Moseley [2003] SCT-QL 44.
47. For example, the provision, s. 22 of the Trade-marksAct, R.S.C. 1985, c, T-10, prevents comparative
advertising at point-of-sale but, oddly, not on radio or television, unless the advertisement is recorded and
viewed near where the goods are sold. See Clairol International v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co.,
[ 1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 552, 55 C.PR. 176, approved in Syntex v. Apotex, [ 1984] 2 F.C. 1012, 1 C.PR. (3d) 145
(C.A.).
48. Compagnie G~nerale des ttablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. NationalAutomobile, Aerospace, Transportationand General Workers Union of Canada (CAW Canada) (1996), [1997] 2 EC. 306,

71 C.P.R. (3d) 349 (T.D) [Michelin3, rejectixg the claim uxder s. 22 of the Trade-marksAct, ibid. See also
Vaver, Intellectual Property,supra note 45 at 216-19.
49. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(4), as am. by the FederalTrademark Dilution Act of 1995.
50. Michelin, supra note 48, may no longer be good law on its view of Charterfree speech rights. See British
ColumbiaAutomobile Assn. v. Ofice and ProfessionalEmployees'Int. Union (2001), 10 C.P.R.(4th) 423, 85
B.C.L.R. (3d) 302 (S.C.); R. v Gignard, [2002] 1 S.C.R 472,209 D.L.R. (4th) 549,2002 SCC 14.
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Smells are probably not registrable in Canada because a mark must
be clearly described and visually depicted. Such constraints did not
inhibit a U.S. appeals panel in the Patent and Trademark Office from
deciding in 1990 to accept a smell as a registrable trademark, in this
case, plumeria scent added to sewing thread.51 Presumably the board
members were keen gardeners and could, in a blindfold test,
differentiate a plumeria from a petunia. Whether the general public
was as discerning is debatable. To vary Dorothy Parker's bon mot
about horticulture: you can take a board to culture but you cannot
make it think.
Canada would nevertheless be expected to follow the U.S. route,
either through legislation or court decision, for the sake of uniformity,
even though other jurisdictions resist registration of such marks, for
good reason. Take the isolated case where fresh cut grass has been
registered in Europe for tennis balls.5" Smell may attract or repel
buyers, even of tennis balls; one suspects that nobody has sought to
register the smell of horse manure for them nor, for that matter, the
smell of the interior of well-worn tennis shoes. But should the first
trader who decides to make his product artificially smell better be
granted a state monopoly for that feature against other like-minded
traders? Generally, one should resist the temptation to grant
monopolies over selling features of a product that may make it more
attractive to buyers, but which at best are merely secondary identifiers
of origin. The consumer has already usually identified the product
through the word, symbol or design mark that has been placed on it.
To allow that secondary characteristic to operate as a mark is to
prevent rival traders from making their product similarly attractive.
It is to grant a limited, but nevertheless quite significant, form of
monopoly over a selling feature.
After a brief flirtation with smell marks, European trademark
registries have gone off them. 3 Most require, as in Canada, that a

51. Re Clarke, 17 U.S.EQ.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
52. Vennootschap OnderFirma SentaAromatic Marketing sApplication, [1999] E.T.M.R. 429 (Eur.
Comm. Trade Marks Office, Second Board of Appeal) [SentaAromatic]. See Debrett Lyons, "Sounds,
Smells and Signs" [19941 E.I.PR. 540. The odour of beer for dart flights, and of roses for tyres, were
registered as trade-marks in the U.K. before the Patent Office took stock and decided to register no
more smells.
53. A smell mark has been declared ineligible for registration as a European Community trade mark
because such marks cannot be represented graphically (Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent und Markenamt,
Case C-273/00 (12 December 2002) (E.C.J.) aff'g the Advocate General's Opinion (6 November
2001), disapproving of the Senta Aromatic case, supra note 52).
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mark be graphically depicted accurately in words or by a drawing,
so that other users of the registry know precisely what is being claimed
and what they must steer clear of. Colours and shapes may no doubt
be accurately displayed, but what of sounds, smells or tastes? Can
the smell of "freshly cut grass" be accurately described for these
purposes? Does all grass smell the same? Is the smell admixed with
the smell of fumes from the gas-driven mower? Does the grass smell
the same from a distance as from close quarters? Does it help to
know that the mark holder said it tested "14 grass fragrancesincluding clay court and hay-before opting for the freshly cut grass
odour? '5 4 Will a spectrogram produced by an electronic nose
technologist suffice to delineate it? Or a reference to the chemical
compound that produces the smell? A deposit of the smelly item?55
Imagine what might now be registered: "Cricket balls that smell of
jock-straps? Footballs that smell of feet? Golf balls that smell of
money?"56 More to the point, how will a rival trader who wants to
apply a smell to his product know when he has produced something
confusingly similar? Will the smell of "newly mown hay" or "freshly
pruned trees" infringe?57 Will an initially neutrally smelling ball
that, with use, acquires the smell of grass become infringing?
Celebrities' rights of publicity currently arise in the U.S. under state
legislation or common law decision. Not all states, however, recognize
such rights. An attempt to enact a federal publicity rights law has so
far stalled. In Canada, publicity rights are probably part of the law
of all the provinces, either at common law or statute, although, as
noted earlier, much about them is yet unclear. Will not harmonization
compel North American-wide recognition of such rights at a high
level-say, celebrity's life plus 50 (70?) years, as in Californiawithout debate on whether the fact or level of these rights is a good
thing or not?

54. Steve Bird, "Game, Scent and Match for Grassy Tennis Balls" The Times of London (25 May
2000) Home News.
55. John Lewis of]HungerfordLtd.s Trade MarkApplication (2000), [2001] R.PC. 28, [2001] E.T.M.R.
104 (Trade Marks Registry Appeal).
56. Graeme Leech, "Melba" The Australian (26 May 2000) Features 14 at para. 12.
57. No doubt the objections to registering smelts as trademarks can be overcome, In patent law,
when it proved difficult to describe a biotechnological invention adequately in words, the PatentAct
was changed to permit the deposit of samples to help round out the disclosure. The Trade-marksAct
could easily be amended to relax the requirement for drawings and visual depictions of the mark by,
for example, allowing a sample of the smell to be deposited (and perhaps periodically refreshed as it
degraded), and to suffice as a substitute for or complement to the writing requirements. The question is whether we should strive to overcome the requirement for visual depiction.
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Copyright
" Copyright in Canada currently runs for the life of the author plus 50
years. In the U.S., it runs for life of the author plus 70 years; so too
in Europe. Will the U.S. now peel back its term by 20 years, or will
Canada have to raise its term to life-plus-70 too? Few can doubt the
answer, and, since the U.S. applied its increase to both new works
and existing works, then-assuming this feature survives its current
constitutional challenge before the U.S. Supreme Court (it did) 5 Canada would do this too.
" In Canada, blank tapes and recordable CDs carry levies to compensate
for private home copying of music. Will the U.S. enact a similar
levy?
" Databases are probably protected in Canada, even those that compile
existing material and involve no creativity. Only "original" work is
protected but originality may include industrious collection. So white
pages telephone directories are probably copyrightable in Canada.5 9
Such directories cannot constitutionally be protected in the U.S.
because the copyright clause in the U.S. Constitution has been
interpreted to require some element of creativity-true "authorship"
beyond sorting material alphabetically is required for work to be
original there. 60 Would Canada adopt the U.S. standard of creativity
and withdraw copyright from existing merely industrious databases?
Or could the U.S. enact a "low-threshold-of-originality" database
law mirroring Canada's, under its powers to implement treaty
61
obligations?
" One area where the level of copyright barrier may not be lifted is for
government works. In the U.S., works of the federal government have
long had no copyright protection, nor have federal and state legislation
and judicial opinions: the people have already paid once for the works
through taxes, and democratic ideals require that the country's laws
be freely accessible to all.
Canada has inherited the British attitude towards such matters:
the Crown claims, either under the CopyrightAct or under the ancient

58. Eldredv. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
59. CCH CanadianLtd., supra note 25, disapproving Tele-Direct, supra note 24, on this point.
60. Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991).
61. See supra note 58.
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royal prerogative, exclusive rights over legislation and possibly even
court opinions (although the judges sometimes claim they own that
copyright). Canada's stance is shared by some other Commonwealth
countries and one or two in Europe, but the trend worldwide is for
such material not to have copyright for public policy reasons.62
Many would be pleased to see Canada and the provinces lose any
possibility of monopoly claims over government works, laws and
court opinions. This gain is however more than offset by the greater
protection Canada would have to extend to private sector works.
Patents

" In the U.S., business methods, computer programs and methods of
medical treatment are patentable. Patenting such material in Canada
(and in Europe, although less so now for computer programs) is
difficult. Undoubtedly Canada would have to change its law to make
these activities clearly patentable. After all, provisions on business
methods and computer programs already appear in TRIPs-plus treaties
that the U.S. has negotiated with developing countries. Canada would
also need to affirm that it would not make or continue any of the
exceptions to patenting that TRIPs allows: anything under the sun
that is made by man-the U.S. patenting standard-would become
Canada's too.
" Would Canada have to scrap the Patented Medicine Prices Review
Board, established a decade ago to oversee price rises for patented
pharmaceuticals? Would Canada extend, as the U.S. does, the duration
of patents for pharmaceuticals to compensate for the time lag in
getting departmental clearance for marketing?
" In Canada, anyone may experiment with a patented invention to see
how it works and to try to improve it. Such experiments are forbidden
in the U.S. One may experiment with an invention out of curiosity
but with no direct or indirect commercial motive. In October 2002,
Duke University was told by a U.S. appeals court that the ordinary
research work it conducted would be classed as commercial for the
purposes of the patent law. A research university attracts better faculty,
students and grants than a non-research one; it can therefore be
considered as commercial an enterprise as any firm listed on the
stock exchange.6 3 Under this rule, much scientific research in

62. See generally Vaver, "Copyright and the State", supra note 3 1.
63. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. den, June 27, 2003 (U.S.S.C.).
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Canadian universities would have to cease or, at least, come under
the control of patent holders and become subject to their scrutiny
and direction. Here is an area of comparative advantage Canada might
well wish to preserve. The U.S. attitude is the strictest in the world.
Europe lets competitors, let alone universities, experiment in patented
inventions. It thinks, rightly, that innovation will occur at a higher
rate, the more people are entitled to do it.'

VI. Part Six
To return to the question posed by this lecture: is more IP everywhere
better?
On looking at the laws of the E.U., Canada and the U.S., one finds IP
laws reach out everywhere. They need not. In many areas, people will be
as creative without IP rights as they are with them: in fact IP rights may
hamper their creativity, especially where existing work is experimented
with, built on and improved. The law is unnecessary to encourage the
activity; instead it acts as an inhibitor.
I mentioned the Michelin case earlier. 65 The Michelin trademark was
registered under both Canadian trademark and copyright law. Ultimately,
Michelin managed to stop the union, not because it was infringing the
trademark (it was not) but because it was infringing copyright in the
trademark. Copyright protection here is cumulative and entirely
adventitious. Even without any copyright law, Michelin would have
produced its Bibendum drawing and adopted it as a trademark. Michelin
gets adequate protection for its logos under trademark law. It does not need
the protection of copyright law. It certainly does not need the level of
protection the court gave it, a right to prevent caricatures of the symbol to
convey information effectively.
This level of protection is also found in other developed country
jurisdictions. It is unnecessary there. It is certainly unnecessary in the
developing world. TRJPs insists on same standards everywhere in the world,
at least for nations which wish to be part of the world trading bloc. The
model is very much a Western model, inspired by U.S. and European law.
Canada supinely backed this model. In fact, in NAFTA, Canada was the
experiment for the new world IP order.

64. See e.g. the German cases where clinical trials were permitted under the experiment exemption
to the German Act, tracking that in the EPC: Klinische Versuche (Clincal Trials) 1 (1995), [19971
R.PC. 623 (German Supreme Court); Klinische Versuche (ClinicalTrials) /, [ 1998] R.P.C. 423 (German Supreme Court).
65. Supra note 48.
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This insistence on high standards of IP protection in developing
countries has had various unfortunate consequences. One is that developing
countries themselves are now looking around to see how they can become
part of this game. Traditional methods of employing herbal medicines used
to be thought of as the common heritage of mankind. They were shared
within communities and handed down. Developing countries now seek to
enclose this knowledge: to claim IP rights in traditional knowledge. They
too are becoming part of the Greek "feta" game: claiming exclusive rights
in geographical indications such as Basmati and Jasmine rice and Darjeeling
tea. They can hardly be blamed. Once the enclosure game has started,
nothing is outside its logic.
Uniformity is sometimes useful. 66 Information assembly and product
development today, more than at any other time in history, are boundless.
Their place of production, distribution or reception is often a matter of
chance. So, at first blush, IP rules concerning these activites should not
differ according to such chance elements.
It is wrong, however, to overstate the benefits of uniformity. While
attractive to theoreticians who like their law tidy, it may sometimes lack
real-world relevance. Thus, e-surfing and e-commerce may function
marginally better with common rules but, even without such rules, they
may function well enough for most practical purposes. In principle,
uniformity makes sense only if good rules are first chosen to be harmonized.
Having one uniform, but bad, rule across a large territory seems a poor
gain over having diverse, but less bad, rules.
The Globe and Mail features a 'Thought du Jour' entry on its front
page and has run a competition for readers to come up with their own
'Thoughts'. One entry in the issue published the following day after Drew
Fagan's NAFTA-plus article read:
A step backwards is a step in the right direction if you are facing the
wrong way to begin with."
This 'Thought' fairly describes what has been happening with IP over
the last decade or two. We should start stepping backwards in the right
direction. We should ask ourselves whether extra IP protection is really
needed and, where it is not, repeal it. We should certainly not ask others to
keep marching forward in the wrong direction.
66. See David Vaver, "Copyright Developments in Europe: The Good, The Bad and the Harmonized"
in Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds., The CommodificationofInformation (The Hague,
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 223 at 236-37.
67. "Thought du Jour" The Globe and Mail (29 October 2002) A26. The entry was credited to Jaime
Smith.

